Secret Retrieval
secret-retrieval
Read, create, update, or rotate a single secret value (API key, password, token, credential) held in a secrets-management platform — HashiCorp Vault (KV v1/v2), 1Password (Connect API), CyberArk Conjur, CyberArk Privilege Cloud, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or Delinea Secret Server. Use when an agent or automation needs to fetch a secret's current value for use elsewhere, store a new value under an existing secret, or trigger/confirm a rotation. Assumes an authenticated client (token, API key, or OAuth session) for the target platform is already available; this skill does not provision or bootstrap that credential. Does not cover PKI certificate issuance (see certificate-management) or configuring a secrets engine/vault/mount itself (enabling KV, creating a Key Vault instance, defining a Conjur policy) — scoped strictly to reading or writing the value of a secret that already has a place to live.
git clone https://github.com/itential/infra-agent-skills.gitcp -r infra-agent-skills/skills/<skill-name> ~/.claude/skills/Secret Retrieval
Reads, creates, updates, or rotates a secret’s value on one of the supported secrets-management
platforms, following that platform’s own documented API shape and access-control model
(references/<platform>/procedure.md).
When to use this skill
- An automation needs the current value of a secret (API key, password, token, connection string) stored in Vault, 1Password, CyberArk Conjur, CyberArk Privilege Cloud, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or Delinea Secret Server, in order to use it in a subsequent call.
- A secret’s value needs to be created, overwritten, or rotated on one of those platforms.
- Not for issuing or renewing a PKI/TLS certificate — see
certificate-management. Not for enabling a secrets engine, creating a vault/Key Vault instance, writing a Conjur policy, or any other one-time setup that makes a place for a secret to live — that’s platform configuration, not secret retrieval, and is out of scope here.
Universal concepts (apply regardless of platform)
- A secret’s value must never appear in plaintext in logs, error messages relayed upward, or audit trails an agent produces itself. Where a platform documents it, it either redacts the value from its own server-side audit log by design or explicitly warns not to pass it through channels that log request bodies — treat this as non-negotiable regardless of which platform is in play, and never echo a retrieved value back into a transcript, ticket, or chat message.
- Every retrieval or write is an access-controlled operation, not an anonymous read. All seven platforms require an authenticated identity (a token, API key, or session) scoped with explicit permission to the specific secret/path/item, and, where a platform documents it, each generates some form of access record for that identity performing that action, though the exact audit mechanism differs (Vault audit device, CloudTrail, platform-native activity log).
- Versioning is not universal — verify it per platform before relying on it. Some platforms keep
a version history a caller can address explicitly; others don’t expose an equivalent
caller-addressable version chain. Don’t assume “read a specific prior version” is possible
everywhere without checking that platform’s own procedure first — see each platform’s own
procedure.mdfor exactly what it supports. - Overwriting or rotating a secret that’s in active use is hard to reverse. Every platform procedure below has its own confirmation gate on this — never skip it because the API call itself would succeed silently.
There is no single wire-level standard (no RFC) governing secrets-management APIs the way DNS has RFC 1035 — each platform below defines its own request/response shape, so “universal concepts” here are behavioral guarantees observed to hold across all seven, not a shared protocol.
Procedure
- Identify the target platform — from the caller’s request or the
platformargument. If it isn’t one of the seven platforms inreferences/INDEX.md, stop: this skill doesn’t cover it, and does not improvise a generic procedure for an unsupported platform. - Open
references/<platform>/procedure.mdand follow it exactly — it holds that platform’s full operational procedure, error handling, patterns, known limitations, tools, and verification checklist. This file is intentionally just the router; the real steps live per platform because authentication, addressing, and versioning genuinely differ across all seven (seereferences/INDEX.mdfor why). - Report the outcome using that platform procedure’s own status vocabulary — don’t normalize it away, and never include the secret’s actual value in that report.
Known limitations
- Does not cover PKI certificate issuance/renewal (see
certificate-management) or any secrets-engine/vault/mount configuration step — every platform procedure here assumes the target secret already has a place to be stored (an existing KV mount/path, vault, safe, or resource) and the caller already has a scoped, authenticated credential for it. - Does not cover bulk/batch export of many secrets at once beyond what a platform’s own procedure documents as a single supported call (e.g. Conjur’s batch-fetch endpoint, where in scope).
- Platform coverage is exactly the seven vendors in
references/INDEX.md— a platform not listed there needs a newreferences/<platform>/procedure.mdbefore this skill can be used for it.
Contributing to this skill
SKILL.md itself should only ever change for two reasons: a bug in the universal concepts/router
logic above, or adding a pointer to a newly-supported platform. Platform-specific procedure
changes — a new error code, a corrected field name, a changed API path — belong in that platform’s
own references/<platform>/procedure.md and endpoints.md, never here. If you’re about to add
vendor-specific detail to this file, put it in the platform’s reference file instead.
Tools
Each platform assumes its own authenticated client (a Vault token, a 1Password Connect token, a
Conjur access token, a Privilege Cloud session token, an AWS SigV4-signed client, an Azure AD
OAuth token, or a Secret Server access token) — see references/INDEX.md for which, and that platform’s procedure.md for the
specific operations/mechanisms.
Verification checklist
- Target platform confirmed against
references/INDEX.mdbefore proceeding - That platform’s own
procedure.mdwas followed, including its own confirmation gates and error handling — not a generic/improvised sequence - The secret’s actual value was never written into a log, report, or status message produced by this skill’s execution
- Outcome reported using the platform procedure’s own status vocabulary